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COMMENT
POWER OF CORPORATIONS TO GUARANTEE AN OBLIGATION
TO PAY MONEY
The New York legislature has once again taken cognizance of the gradually
increasing liberality of the common law with reference to the power of a corporation to guarantee obligations to pay money.' Chapter 695 of the Laws of
1944 not only has added two subdivisions to Section 19 of the Stock Corporation Law which enumerate additional instances in which exception is taken
to the general prohibition against the power of a corpoiation to guarantee but
has also greatly enlarged the type of obligations to which the statute previously applied.2 Prior to these changes the statute recognized guaranties only
of the bonds of another corporation (and not obligations to pay money generally) upon the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of its outstanding shares
entitled to vote at a meeting called in accordance with statutory procedure, or
in the absence of a meeting, by the unanimous written consent of all outstanding shares entitled to vote. In the event that the guarantor corporation
owned directly or indirectly a majority of the voting shares of the other
corporation such guaranty could be given when approved by a resolution of
the board of directors, so authorizing 3 The amendment to the statute broadens
the scope of the power to guarantee by permitting it to be exercised generally,
i.e., with reference to any obligation to pay money. In addition, apart from
incorporating the existing circumstances under which the guaranty may issue,
it provides that the power may be exercised when in connection with and Incidental to the corporate functions for which it was created or when made in
connection with the negotiation by sale or otherwise of an obligation owned
by it.4 It should be noted, however, that with the exception of the provision
that enlarges the scope of the guaranty to all obligations to pay money, the
amendment introduces no novel principles of law. In effect it is no more than
a statement of the common law holdings on the subject.
The history of this statute is characterized by cautious legislative icceptance
1. N. Y. Laws 1944, c. 695 effective April 9, 1944, amending N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 464
which amended N. Y. Laws 1923, c. 787 and N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 61, § 19.
2. N. Y. Laws 1944, c. 695 provides in effect that any stork corporation may guarantee
any obligation for the payment of the money (a) when made in connection with the
exercise of its rights and purposes or (b) when made in connection with the negotiation
of an obligation owned by it or (c) when the guarantor corporation owns directly or
indirectly a majority of the voting shares of the other corporation and the guaranty is
authorized by the board of directors of the guarantor corporation or (d) when authorized
by the affirmative resolution of two-thirds of the voting shares of the guarantor corporation
at a meeting called pursuant to statutory regulation or in the absence of a meeting by
the unanimous written consent of the voting shares.
3. N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 464.,
4. See note 2 supra.
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of the common law tendency to liberalize what was once considered in nearly
all instances to be an ultra vires action of a corporation. A corporation has
always been considered to possess as much as and no more than the aggregate
of powers 5 which were expressly or impliedly conferred upon it by its charter.0
Thus it followed that a corporation could not contract unless the subject of the
contract was one expressly authorized or was one strictly necessary 7 or incidental to the express purposes for which the corporation was created.
It has been vigorously c6ntended by many that (with the obvious exception
of those institutions expressly created to act as surety or guarantor) corporations engaged in ordinary commercial pursuits are not empowered to become
surety in the absence of express authority and that all such acts are on their
face ultra vires.8 The reason why the power is generally denied follows from
the obvious fact that a business corporation is formed to further the financial
interests of its stockholders and not to lend money and credit gratuitously. 9
Accordingly the earliest views on the topic demonstrate a readiness to permit
corporations to guarantee only under such situations of fact that clearly show
the act to be strictly necessary to the financial well-being of the guarantor.
However, the courts have held quite consistently that gainfulness or expediency
cannot stand as the sole test of the power to guarantee. The fact that it
enables a corporation to reap a profit is not efnough to make a presumptively
ultra vires act permissible. 10 To establish that lending of credit would be
profitable to the corporation would not, in the eyes of the common law, establish the right to do so."' Indeed, even if a substantial consideration were given
5. The use of the word "powers" in reference to corporations conveys the notion of
authority and right to act as distinguished from the mere ability to act. See Freligh v.
Saugerties, 70 Hun 589, 24 N. Y. Supp. 182, 185 (3d Dept. 1893).
6. Weckler v. First National Bank of Hagerstown, 42 Md. 581, 20 Am. Rep. 95 (1875);
People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bk., 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537, affirming 276
11. App. 21 (1934); Wagg v. Toler, 80 Cal. App. 501, 251 Pac. 973 (1926).
7. Woods Lumber (;o. v. Moore, 183 Cal. 497, 191 Pac. 905 (1920), 19 MZcu. L. Ry.
216.
8. Limerick Mills v. Royal Textile Co., 228 Mass. 479, 193 N. E. 9 (1934); Strauss v.
W. H. Strauss and Co., 330 Pa. 317, 199 At. 195 (1938); Norfolk Mattress Co.-v. Royal
Mfg. Co., 160 Va. 623, 169 S. E. 586 (1933); Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co., 249 Mass.
585, 144 N.E. 749 (1924).
9. Harms Co. v. Michel Brewing Co., 228 N. Y. 118, 126 N. E. 710 (1920); M. V.
Monarch Co. v. Farmers and T. Bank, 105 Ky. 430, 49 S. W. 317, 88 Am. St. Rep. 310
(1899); Fox. v. Rural Home Co., 90 Hun. 365, 35 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1st Dept. 1895),
aff'd without opinion 157 N. Y. 684, 51 N. E. 1090 (1898); McClellan v. Detroit File
Works, 56 Mich. 579, 23 N. W. 321 (1885).
10. Gulf Yellow Pine Lumber Co. v. Chapman, 159 Ala. 444, 48 So. 662 (1909); Globe
Indemnity Co. v. McCullom, 313 Pa. 135, 169 AUl. 76 (1933).
11. Germania Safety Vault and Trust Co. v. Boynton, 71 Fed. 797 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896);
Rogers v. Jewell Belting Co., 184 Ill. 574, 56 N. E. 1017 (1900); Ward v. Joslin, 105
Fed. 224 (C. C. A. 1st, 1900).
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in return for an act of guaranty, a presumption of capacity to act would not
be adduced.' 2 A fortiori, it cannot be assumed that authority to extend credit
exists because benefit is to be derived from a contract made with the corporation whose obligation is guaranteed.' 3 Almost without exception the courts
hive held that the test for determining whether an act of a corporation is
ultra vires is not to consider whether the transaction is a source of profit or
advantage but whether4 it can be classified as one within the scope or purpose
of the corporate aims.'
Nevertheless, the factual situations in which the power has been sanctioned
indicate that the rule has a reasonably brpad application. Thus it has beenheld that, when a manufacturing corporation advanced funds to a manufacturer
in order that the latter might supply raw materials for the reason that the
former could not have operated with the same efficiency without them,.it was
acting intra vires. 5 In addition, a charitable institution may give bonds or
undertakings to insure and facilitate the admission of refugee children into
the United States, when the facts establish that the corporation was founded
with that as one of its general purposes. 16 Further facts incidental to the
issuance of the guaranty may exist which may influence the courts to construe
the use of the power more readily. The cases indicate that this willingness
to relax the strict construction is applied in situations where the act falls
generally into the regular line of corporate business and where (a) a contract
12. National Park Bank v. German American Mutual Warehouse and Security Co.,
116 N. Y. 281, 22 N. E. 567 (1889); Carlaftes v. Goldmeyer Co., 72 Misc. 75, 129 N. Y.
Supp. 396 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
13. Hayes v. State ex rel. Olroyd Mach. Co., 124 Ohio Stat. 485, 179 N. E. 402 (1931),
where a bond given by one corporation 'to stay execution upon the property of another
was held ultra vires, notwithstanding the fact that the guarantor, a manufacturer, bad
acted to protect its interest under a contract with the judgment debtor who was the
designer, patentee and distributor of the manufacured articles.
14. In re German-Jewish Children's Aid, Inc., 151 Misc. 834, 272 N. Y. Supp. 540
(Sup. Ct. 1934); Koehler & Co. v. Reinheimer, 26 App. Div. 1, 49 N. Y. Supp. 755 (1st
Dept. 1898); Fuld v. Burr Brewing Co., 18 N. Y. Supp. 456 (N. Y. City Ct. 1892).
15. Holmes, Booth & Haydens v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75, 25 N. E. 1083 (1890)'; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kiser, 18 S. E. 358, 91 Ga. 636 (1893); State ex inf. Gentry v. LongBell Lumber Co., 321 Mo. 461, 12 S. W. (2d) 64 (1928); but cf. Western Maryland R.
Co. v. Blue Hotel Co., 102 Md. 307, 62 AUt. 351; 111 Am. St. Rep. 362 (1905), where the
court refused to recognize the power of a railroading corporation to guarantee payment
of interest and dividends on the bonds and siock of a hotel situated along the line; Lucas
v. White Line Transfer Ca., 70 Iowa 541, 30 N. W. 771, 59 Am. Rep. 449 (1886), where
the underwriting of an independent ferry service by a railroad whose passengers utilized
it as a connecting link was held ultra vires. Both of these decisions were based on the
ground that the act of guaranty though beneficial to, was not strictly necessary to the
carrying out of the corporate enterprise.
16. In re German-Jewish Children's Aid, Inc., 151 Misc. 834, 272 N. Y. Supp. 540 (Sup.
Ct. 1934).
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has been made and the guaranty forms part of the consideration or (b) the
guaranty is given to secure the collection of a debt or to negotiate an obligation
held by it or (c) where the guarantor is protecting its interest in a subsidiary
corporation. Accordingly as an instance of situation (a) it was held that when
a contract existed between a lumber company and a building contractor, the
former had the power to become surety on the latter's bond when it was neces7
sary in order to procure the contract and secure the contractor's business.1
By identical reasoning a brewing corporation was held to be acting intra vires
when guaranteeing the rent of a customer' s and another brewing corporation
was acting within its implicit authority in becoming surety on a liquor bond.' 9
Rule (b) was applicable when a debt owed to a corporation .nd in order
to protect itself from loss, the corporation issued a guaranty in an attempt
to secure the solvency of the debtor. The court held that the defense of Idtra
vires was not available to the guarantor on the ground that the corporation
had acted to protect its debt and thus-had been implicitly empowered. 20 Thus,
a railroad company without the express power of guaranty was within the
scope of implied authority when it took the bonds of another corporation as
2
payment of a debt and in order to facilitate their sale, guaranteed them. '
The power to indorse, which is itself a form of guaranty, is generally acknowl22
edged when a corporation has taken a note in satisfaction of an obligation.
In providing for the issuance of a corporation guaranty under such circumstances, the amendment under discussion is merely paraphrasing an established
common law, rule which recognized the fact that in obligating itself upon a
chose in action already in its possession the corporation was not assuming a
new liability but merely warranting an asset which it sold. The courts, in
formulating.rule (c), have decided that when the guarantor had pledged its
credit in favor of another corporation, all of whose stock it owned, the defense
17. Wheeler, Osgood & Co. v. Everett Land Co., 14 Wash. 630, 45 Pac. 316 (1896);
Wittmer Lumber Co. v. Rice, 23 Ind. App. 586, 55 N. E. 868 (1900); National Bank of
Commerce v. Allen, 90 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898). Contra: In re S. P. Smith Lumber
Co., 132 Fed. 620 (N. D. Texas, 1904).

18. Holm v. Claus Lipsius Brewing Co., 21 App. Div. 204, 47 N. Y. Supp. 518 (2d Dept.
1897); Winterfield v. Beam City Brewing Co., 96 Wis. 239, 71 N. W. 101 (1897).
19. Horst v. Lewis, 71 Neb. 365, 98 N. W. 1046, 103 N. W. 460 (1905); Kraft v.
West Side Brewery Co., 219 I1. 205, 76 N. E. 372 (1905); accord, Garrison Canning Co. v.
Stanley, 133 Iowa 57, 110 N. W. 171 (1907) ; Frese v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York,
11 Cal. App. 387, 105 Pac. 265 (1909).
20. North Texas State Bk. v. Crowley Southerland Commission Co., 145 S. W. 1027
(1912); see American Surety Co. v. Philippine National Bk., 245 N. Y. 116, 156 N. E.
634 (1927).
21. Rogers Locomotive Works v. So. R.R. Ass'n, 34 Fed. 278 (1888); Arnot v. Erie
R.R., 67 N. Y. 315 (1876); accord, Broadway Nat'l Bk. v. Baker, 176 Mass. 294, 57 N. E.
603 (1900).
22.

Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 13 N. Y. 309 (1855).
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of ultra vires is not available against a surety company to which the defendant
had given an agreement of indemnity.2 The reason given for the rejection
of the defense was that, although the court recognized that the main business
of the corporation was encompassed by those acts performed in direct furtherance of the corporate aim, it would also permit, under certain circumstances,
the issuance of guaranties necessary to contracts and transactions incidental
of auxiliary to its main business. The ownership of all or a majority
of
24
Most
shares in another corporation was considered such a circumstance.
jurisdictions are in accord on this point and New York common law recognized
that, where the defendant had in good faith guaranteed bonds of another
corporation, the fact that the guarantor corporation had a majority interest in
the other would except the guarantor from the general prohibition against
ultra vires guaranties. 25 The power of a corporation, by a resolution of its
board of directors, to pledge credit in favor of another, a majority of whose
stock is either directly or indirectly owned by the guarantor, is recognized in
New York by the statute under discussion.
It appears, therefore, that the recently adopted provisions of the statute
to a great extent merely codify the recognized common-law on the subject of
corporation guaranties. The one departure that is of any appreciable consequence is the extension of the subject matter of the guaranty of a subsidiary's
debts, or those of another corporation where the stockholders consent, to
include obligations to pay money generally and not merely bonds, as had
been hitherto permitted. When viewed in connection with the enumerated
instances under which a guaranty may now be given, this clause contemplates a
leniency which was not enjoyed prior to this amendment. If the statute is
given a purely literal interpretation, in the case of a subsidiary of the guarantor
or when at least two-thirds of the guarantor's stockholders consent, the guaranty may be issued upon any 'money obligation incurred by any other person,
firm or corporation, even though the guaranty is patently inconsistent with
the corporate powers and entirely without benefit to its stockholders. Would
the courts countenance a pledge of credit in an instance where the president
of a corporation, in control of two-thirds of the voting shares, guaranteed in
the name of the corporation the payment of -jewelry purchased by his wife?
judicial conservativeness may well refuse to recognize such a liberal use of
the corporate power to guarantee even though the literal interpretation of the
amended statute might permit such non-corporate use.
23.

American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. 14 Canal St., Inc., 276 Mass. 119, 176 N. E. 785

(1931).
24.

Jesselsohn v. Boorstein, 111 N. J. Eq. 310, 162 Atl. 254 (1932).

25. Nurick v. Baker, -

Misc. -, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).

